Interjacency
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Interjacency
zbMATH Open document ID: 0709.90006
DOI: 10.1007/BF00446990
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: It is well known that social choice rules have at least one profile at which they are manipulable. In this short note, the author reports some constructions that lead to interjacency conjectures of the following type: for a certain class of rules, determine m, the minimum number such that there is a rule \(f_ 1\) in the class with exactly m profiles at which \(f_ 1\) is manipulable, and determine M, the maximum number such that there is a rule \(f_ 2\) in the class with exactly M profiles at which \(f_ 2\) is manipulable. Then, for every integer n between m and M, there is a rule in the class with exactly n profiles at which it is manipulable. Such an interjacency conjecture seems to be of much interest and is worthy of further investigation.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4167785
zbMATH Keywords: manipulability
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: interjacency
author: Jerry S. Kelly
reviewed by: Yasuhiro Sakai
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00446990
OpenAlex ID: W4232858801
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4167785