Comparative cooperative game theory
This paper considers comparisons between two n-person cooperative games v and \(\hat v\) with and/or without sidepayments. Comparisons are made based on the criterion: whether or not, for each core imputation y of game v, there exists a core imputation x of game \(\hat v\) such that x Pareto dominates y. Two other variations of the criterion are given (the reviewer does not understand the motivation for these criteria). Then the paper gives certain properties of these criteria and shows that these criteria can be characterized for the classes of convex games and exact games. Also, the paper introduces the class of no-gap games, which is smaller than the class of exact games and is larger than the class of convex games. Some results for games with sidepayments hold for games without sidepayments.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4167876
scientific article