Communication between rational agents
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Communication between rational agents
zbMATH Open document ID: 0709.90107
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-O
author: Matthew Rabin
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper deals with the study of credible communication in simple communication games. As a matter of fact, the author introduces a new solution concept which does guarantee communication in some games. The solution concept in question is called Credible Message Rationalizability and combines the assumptions of rich language and rationality of agents. That is, the author assumes both full rationality without imposing equilibrium conditions and the natural behaviour of agents about the use of language: agents have a propensity to speak the truth and to believe others speak the truth, but use the game's strategic incentives to check whether such behavior and beliefs are rational. The author also introduces an equilibrium version of the concept developed and proves the existence of the so-called Credible Message Equilibrium for simple communicaton games. The theory developed is illustrated by several examples.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4167878
zbMATH Keywords: credible communication
zbMATH Keywords: simple communication games
zbMATH Keywords: Credible Message Rationalizability
reviewed by: Theo S. H. Driessen
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission
cites work: Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
cites work: Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
cites work: Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(90)90055-o
OpenAlex ID: W2144409969
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4167878