Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91007
author: Jens Josephson
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-05-26T00:00:00Z
review text: The author studies a model where individuals from finite populations are repeatedly drawn to play a finite game and in every period choose a weakly better reply (not necessarily a best reply) to a sample distribution from a finite history of past play. It is shown that if the sample is small enough, the dynamics converges globally to sets of states that span MCUBR sets (minimal closed sets under better replies). In particular, there is convergence almost surely to a strict Nash equilibrium from any initial state if and only if all MCUBR sets are singleton.
reviewed by: Jérôme Renault
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60J20
zbMATH DE Number: 5278984
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic adaptation
zbMATH Keywords: better replies
zbMATH Keywords: weakly acyclic games
zbMATH Keywords: Markov chains
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-007-0230-y
OpenAlex ID: W2148866170
cites work: Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
cites work: Satisficing behavior, Brouwer's fixed point theorem and Nash equilibrium
cites work: From evolutionary to strategic stability.
cites work: Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
cites work: Q3672830
cites work: Learning in games by random sampling
cites work: Learning by forgetful players
cites work: Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
cites work: Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
cites work: The Evolution of Conventions
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0230-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5278984