Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
zbMATH Open document ID: 1203.91022
author: Roland Pongou
author: Lawrence Diffo Lambo
author: Bertrand Tchantcho
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-05-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5279000
zbMATH Keywords: collective choice
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: binding solidarity agreements
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto-optimality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-007-0251-6
OpenAlex ID: W1976597449
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0251-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5279000