Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91024
author: Carlos Pimienta
author: Cristian M. Litan
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-05-26T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors study equilibrium properties of finite extensive form games \(\Gamma\) with perfect recall. In their interesting paper, they analyze the following sets: subgame perfect equilibria (SPE(\(\Gamma\))), sequential equilibria (SQE(\(\Gamma\))), subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes (SPEO(\(\Gamma\))) and sequential equilibrium outcomes (SQEO(\(\Gamma\))). Two interesting and nontrivial results have been obtained. In the first one, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for games \(\Gamma\) to satisfy the property, SPE(\(\Gamma\)) = SQE(\(\Gamma\)) for all payoff vectors. The second result gives the same for the property, SPEO(\(\Gamma\)) = SQEO(\(\Gamma\)) for all payoff vectors. The paper ends with several examples of models discussed in the literature and related to the obtained results in the paper. It is worth mentioning that the paper is exceptionally clearly written and it can be very helpful also for readers who would want to quickly familiarize with all the basic notions of theory of extensive form games and various types of equilibria considered there.
reviewed by: Tadeusz Radzik
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
zbMATH DE Number: 5279003
zbMATH Keywords: extensive form game
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: minimal subform
zbMATH Keywords: avoidable information set
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-007-0256-1
OpenAlex ID: W2041596968
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0256-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5279003