Sequencing games with repeated players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequencing games with repeated players
zbMATH Open document ID: 1141.91006
author: Arantza Estévez-Fernández
author: Pedro Calleja
author: Herbert Hamers
author: Peter Borm
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 2008-05-27T00:00:00Z
review text: Consider a sequencing situation in which a finite set of players, \(N\), are assigned to a finite set of jobs, \(M\), in a certain sequence, \(s\), with an attached cost profile \(c(s)\). Let \((N, v)\) be the cooperative game associated with the sequencing situation, where \(v(S)\) maximizes cost savings for coalition \(S\) to fill all jobs. The paper considers two types of cooperative game: (1) max, in which case each player's cost is linear in maximum completion time of his jobs; (2) min, in which case each player's cost is linear in minimum completion time of his jobs. The paper constructs rule sequences such that both max and min have non-empty cores, and the job sequence so constructed is in the core. In addition, min is a convex game, and so has a large core.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 5279111
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: sequencing
zbMATH Keywords: equal gain splitting
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: convex
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10479-007-0237-6
OpenAlex ID: W3023755323
cites work: Q4708452
cites work: Job scheduling, cooperation, and control
cites work: Sequencing games
cites work: Cores of convex games
cites work: Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
DOI: 10.1007/S10479-007-0237-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5279111