Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1134.91388
author: René Kirkegaard
author: Per Baltzer Overgaard
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2008-05-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5277654
zbMATH Keywords: first-price and second-price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric bidders
zbMATH Keywords: pre-auction offers
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2007.09.006
OpenAlex ID: W3121295896
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2007.09.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5277654