Adaptation and complexity in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Adaptation and complexity in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1134.91329
author: Eliot Maenner
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2008-05-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 5277655
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: complexity
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2007.07.008
OpenAlex ID: W2145150393
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2007.07.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5277655