Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
zbMATH Open document ID: 1134.91343
author: Christina Pawlowitsch
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2008-05-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5277657
zbMATH Keywords: language evolution
zbMATH Keywords: sender-receiver game
zbMATH Keywords: suboptimality
zbMATH Keywords: neutral stability
zbMATH Keywords: replicator dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: Lyapunov stability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2007.08.009
OpenAlex ID: W2087264963
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2007.08.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5277657