Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
zbMATH Open document ID: 1136.91498
author: Grigory Kosenok
author: Sergei Severinov
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-06-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 5287864
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian implementation
zbMATH Keywords: individual rationality
zbMATH Keywords: ex-post budget balancing
zbMATH Keywords: surplus allocation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2007.07.002
OpenAlex ID: W2019313657
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.07.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5287864