A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91437
author: Franz Dietrich
author: Christian List
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2008-06-30T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation (LSERO).pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5294675
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2059915693
cites work: Liberal Values and Independence
cites work: Democratic answers to complex questions -- an epistemic perspective
cites work: Conditional desirability
cites work: Liberalism and individual preferences
cites work: Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
cites work: Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems
cites work: A generalised model of judgment aggregation
cites work: The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications
cites work: Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
cites work: Liberalism, efficiency, and stability: Some possibility results
cites work: Freedom of choice and diversity of options: some difficulties
cites work: The limits of epistemic democracy
cites work: Merging Information Under Constraints: A Logical Framework
cites work: A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions
cites work: The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions
cites work: Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
cites work: Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
cites work: Logical constraints on judgement aggregation
cites work: Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation
cites work: Algebraic aggregation theory
cites work: On the theory of aggregation
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0263-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5294675