Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
zbMATH Open document ID: 1141.91328
author: Jérôme Renault
author: Sergio Scarlatti
author: Marco Scarsini
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2008-06-26T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: mindiscount20071212.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 5293439
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: public equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: private equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto-efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: discount factor
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2269158136
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5293439