On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91491
author: Claudio Mezzetti
author: Ilia Tsetlin
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2008-07-11T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: twerp 832.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5300744
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: lowest-winning bid
zbMATH Keywords: highest-losing bid
zbMATH Keywords: \(k\) th price auction
zbMATH Keywords: \((k+1)\) st price auction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2077652138
cites work: Equilibria in open common value auctions
cites work: The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
cites work: The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
cites work: Uses of exchangeability
cites work: Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
cites work: Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
cites work: Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
cites work: Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.12.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5300744