Ex post implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ex post implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91434
author: B. E. Eshmatov
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2008-07-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5300767
zbMATH Keywords: ex post equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: single crossing
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2006.10.006
OpenAlex ID: W3023268692
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2006.10.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5300767