Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91468
author: Moshe Babaioff
author: Liad Blumrosen
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2008-07-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5300769
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: approximation algorithms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2006.07.002
OpenAlex ID: W3124906108
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2006.07.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5300769