Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
zbMATH Open document ID: 1140.91356
author: Tibor Neugebauer
author: Javier Perote
published in: Experimental Economics
publication date: 2008-07-30T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: s10683-007-9166-0
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5306141
zbMATH Keywords: Experimental economics
zbMATH Keywords: First-price sealed-bid auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Independent private value model
zbMATH Keywords: Bidding theory
zbMATH Keywords: Risk aversion
zbMATH Keywords: Learning
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1997913516
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cites work: Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
cites work: Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
cites work: Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
cites work: Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
cites work: Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
cites work: Learning direction theory and the winner's curse
cites work: `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
DOI: 10.1007/S10683-007-9166-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5306141