Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1144.91317
author: Phillip G. Bradford
author: Sunju Park
author: Michael H. Rothkopf
author: Heejin Park
published in: Electronic Commerce Research
publication date: 2008-07-31T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 94A60
zbMATH DE Number: 5306383
zbMATH Keywords: cryptographic Vickrey actions
zbMATH Keywords: bidder incentives
zbMATH Keywords: Yao's millionaires' protocol
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10660-008-9013-1
OpenAlex ID: W2070050027
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DOI: 10.1007/S10660-008-9013-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5306383