Rational probabilistic deciders. II: Collective behavior
Summary: This paper explores the behavior of rational probabilistic deciders (RPDs) in three types of collectives: zero sum matrix games, fractional interactions, and Edgeworth exchange economies. The properties of steady states and transients are analyzed as a function of the level of rationality, \(N\), and, in some cases, the size of the collective, \(M\). It is shown that collectives of RPDs, may or may not behave rationally, depending, for instance, on the relationship between \(N\) and \(M\) (under fractional interactions) or \(N\) and the minimum amount of product exchange (in Edgeworth economies). The results obtained can be useful for designing rational reconfigurable systems that can autonomously adapt to changing environments. [For part I, cf. ibid. 35897 (2007; Zbl 1141.91339).]
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5311270
scientific article