Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1140.91448
author: Hitoshi Matsushima
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-08-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
zbMATH DE Number: 5312916
zbMATH Keywords: large economies
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent values
zbMATH Keywords: unique implementation
zbMATH Keywords: detail-free mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: twice iterative dominance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2007.09.004
OpenAlex ID: W1996782901
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5312916