Computing the minimal covering set
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Computing the minimal covering set
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91725
author: Felix Brandt
author: Felix Fischer
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2008-09-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-04
zbMATH DE Number: 5323869
zbMATH Keywords: social choice theory
zbMATH Keywords: minimal covering set
zbMATH Keywords: essential set
zbMATH Keywords: uncovered set
zbMATH Keywords: computational complexity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001
OpenAlex ID: W2098386424
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.04.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5323869