Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91663
author: Fuhito Kojima
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2008-09-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 5343988
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-007-0287-3
OpenAlex ID: W2055575901
cites work: College admissions with affirmative action
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cites work: Q3999327
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0287-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343988