Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91419
author: Kazuhiko Hashimoto
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2008-09-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
zbMATH DE Number: 5343990
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-007-0289-1
OpenAlex ID: W2063147808
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0289-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343990