Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1147.91002
author: Rodrigo Harrison
author: Roberto Muñoz
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-09-23T00:00:00Z
review text: The referred paper contributes to the non-cooperative approach to the link formation game model and analysis. It is based on the global games theory, and its fundamental object of interest is the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium of such game. The main goal of the analysis is to select Nash equilibria which are robust to the incompleteness of information. It is shown by the main result of the paper that there exists exactly one such equilibrium. Its stability property is confronted with the stability of the Nash equilibria derived by an alternative (namely, cooperative) approach.
reviewed by: Milan Mareš
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
zbMATH DE Number: 5346099
zbMATH Keywords: global games
zbMATH Keywords: networks
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: link formation game
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-007-0309-5
OpenAlex ID: W1967001928
cites work: Q3254691
cites work: Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
cites work: Stable networks
cites work: Link formation in cooperative situations.
cites work: Strongly stable networks
cites work: A strategic model of social and economic networks
cites work: Q3999542
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0309-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5346099