Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1176.91062
author: Toyotaka Sakai
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-09-23T00:00:00Z
review text: The author considers auction theory. Auction theory usually assumes that bidders have quasi-linear preferences. In this article the existence and characterization of desirable auction rules for non-quasi-linear preference is investigated. It is shown that second price mechanisms (Vickrey mechanism) can be generalized by the use of the maximum willingness to pay, and the rules so generalized are still the only rules satisfying the sets of axioms characterizing second price mechanism.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5346100
zbMATH Keywords: second price mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: non-quasi-linear preference
zbMATH Keywords: auction theory
zbMATH Keywords: envy-freeness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-007-0311-y
OpenAlex ID: W2050349682
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0311-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5346100