Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91654
author: Gabriel A. Madeira
author: Robert M. Townsend
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-10-29T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: pmc2811312
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5358728
zbMATH Keywords: risk sharing
zbMATH Keywords: incentives
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: relative performance
zbMATH Keywords: networks
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1979456840
Wikidata QID: Q33610098
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DBLP publication ID: journals/jet/MadeiraT08
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.03.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5358728