Stability of marriage with externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability of marriage with externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1153.91689
author: Isa E. Hafalir
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2008-11-25T00:00:00Z
review text: Endogenously introduced beliefs are introduced into a matching game. Sufficient conditions for the estimation functions to be compatible with the existence stable matching are derived. A particular notion of beliefs (called sophisticated expectations) is introduced. It is shown that with them, stable matching always exist. An algorithm to determine them is given. A generalization of the concept of core is given. It is called the bargaining set. A sufficient condition on the preferences to ensure that it is nonempty is provided.
reviewed by: E. Ahmed
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5373427
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-008-0122-9
OpenAlex ID: W2130543692
cites work: Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
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cites work: Two-sided matching problems with externalities
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-008-0122-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5373427