A bargaining approach to coordination in networks
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A bargaining approach to coordination in networks
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91019
author: Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2008-11-25T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: wpasad-2007-28.pdf
review text: This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a stag-hunt game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not fixed exogenously, but from bargaining. The model analyses both in a static and in a dynamic setting. Whereas the static game has multiplicity of equilibria, the paper shows that the only one is stochastically stable.
reviewed by: Klaus Ehemann
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 5373432
zbMATH Keywords: coordination
zbMATH Keywords: Nash bargaining solution
zbMATH Keywords: risk-dominance
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic stability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2001906349
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-008-0127-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5373432