Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91063
author: Erwan Quintin
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-12-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 5375968
zbMATH Keywords: limited enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: informal sector
zbMATH Keywords: economic development
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-007-0295-7
OpenAlex ID: W2024452799
cites work: Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
cites work: Debt Constrained Asset Markets
cites work: Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
cites work: Communication, commitment, and growth
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0295-7
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5375968