Moral hazard with bounded payments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Moral hazard with bounded payments
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91536
author: Ian Jewitt
author: Ohad Kadan
author: Jeroen M. Swinkels
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-12-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B42
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 5382900
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent models
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: limited liability
zbMATH Keywords: compensation
zbMATH Keywords: options
zbMATH Keywords: duality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2102894795
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5382900