Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91456
author: Alberto Galasso
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-12-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 5382921
zbMATH Keywords: coordination
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: multilateral externalities
zbMATH Keywords: multi-agent games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2007.12.001
OpenAlex ID: W2062705828
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.12.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5382921