Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91367
author: Jérôme Mathis
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2008-12-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5382922
zbMATH Keywords: disclosure of certifiable information
zbMATH Keywords: partial provability
zbMATH Keywords: persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: separating equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: verifiable types
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2007.12.002
OpenAlex ID: W1985238910
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.12.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5382922