A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1188.91037
author: Gustav Feichtinger
author: George Leitmann
author: Andreas J. Novak
published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
publication date: 2010-04-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 5696837
zbMATH Keywords: differential games
zbMATH Keywords: counterterror measures
zbMATH Keywords: Nash solution
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg solution
zbMATH Keywords: state-separable games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10957-009-9643-z
OpenAlex ID: W2106943724
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DOI: 10.1007/S10957-009-9643-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5696837