Self-admissible sets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Self-admissible sets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1238.91035
author: Adam Brandenburger
author: Amanda Friedenberg
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-05-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 5707045
zbMATH Keywords: admissibility
zbMATH Keywords: weak dominance
zbMATH Keywords: self-admissible sets
zbMATH Keywords: iterated admissibility
zbMATH Keywords: epistemic game theory
zbMATH Keywords: perfect-information games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2009.11.003
OpenAlex ID: W2059624968
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.11.003
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5707045