Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1203.91203
author: Fuhito Kojima
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2010-05-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 5705306
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: nonbossiness
zbMATH Keywords: impossibility theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2009.12.029
OpenAlex ID: W2049720373
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.12.029
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5705306