The bargaining set of a large game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The bargaining set of a large game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1203.91014
author: Massimiliano Amarante
author: Luigi Montrucchio
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-05-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
zbMATH DE Number: 5708674
zbMATH Keywords: Mas-Colell bargaining set
zbMATH Keywords: maximal excess game
zbMATH Keywords: core-equivalence
zbMATH Keywords: thin games
zbMATH Keywords: market games
zbMATH Keywords: Lyapunov convexity theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-008-0433-x
OpenAlex ID: W1967863885
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0433-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5708674