The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
zbMATH Open document ID: 1229.91247
author: Jinpeng Ma
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2010-05-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 5711760
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2009.12.005
OpenAlex ID: W2139345328
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cites work: Q4902563
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cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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cites work: Q3999327
cites work: Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5711760