The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1280.91071
author: Thiago Revil T. Ferreira
author: Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2010-05-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5711895
zbMATH Keywords: effective default enforcements
zbMATH Keywords: collateral guarantees
zbMATH Keywords: individual's optimality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2009.12.004
OpenAlex ID: W2054098822
cites work: Q4267848
cites work: Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets
cites work: Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
cites work: Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral
cites work: Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
cites work: A derivative-coderivative inclusion in second-order nonsmooth analysis
cites work: Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain
cites work: General equilibrium in CLO markets
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5711895