Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
zbMATH Open document ID: 1245.91034
author: Humberto Moreira
author: Aloisio Araujo
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-05-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5710850
zbMATH Keywords: Spence-Mirrlees condition
zbMATH Keywords: global incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: U-shaped condition
zbMATH Keywords: discrete pooling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2010.02.010
OpenAlex ID: W3121676470
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2010.02.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5710850