Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1245.91035
author: Liad Blumrosen
author: Noam Nisan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-05-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5710854
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Keywords: package auctions
zbMATH Keywords: ascending auctions
zbMATH Keywords: non-linear prices
zbMATH Keywords: personalized prices
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2009.10.012
OpenAlex ID: W1991758835
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.10.012
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5710854