On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1188.91084
author: B. E. Eshmatov
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2010-06-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5720387
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial auction
zbMATH Keywords: primal-dual auction
zbMATH Keywords: subgradient auction
zbMATH Keywords: allocative efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: computational experiment
zbMATH Keywords: simulation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2010.01.038
OpenAlex ID: W2035884894
cites work: Q3588651
cites work: The package assignment model.
cites work: On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
cites work: Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
cites work: Core-selecting package auctions
cites work: On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
cites work: Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
cites work: A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
cites work: Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
cites work: Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
cites work: Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations
cites work: Combinatorial auction design
cites work: Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
cites work: Computationally manageable combinational auctions
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2010.01.038
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5720387