Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1230.91021
author: Robert A. Van Gorder
author: Michael R. Caputo
publication date: 2010-06-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5720449
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg duopoly
zbMATH Keywords: envelope theorems
zbMATH Keywords: differential games
zbMATH Keywords: open-loop information structure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jedc.2010.01.016
OpenAlex ID: W1987863974
cites work: Q4226167
cites work: Fundamental symmetries and qualitative properties in the adjustment cost model of the firm
cites work: Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis
cites work: The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games
cites work: A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
cites work: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Differential Game Solutions to an Investment and Pricing Problem
cites work: Q4328564
cites work: When is reputation bad?
cites work: Optimal investment, financing, and dividends. A Stackelberg differential game
cites work: Pollution control: A differential game approach
cites work: Q4040443
cites work: The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
cites work: Dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop complete information
cites work: Games with espionage
cites work: Q4610958
cites work: On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games
DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2010.01.016
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5720449