International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
zbMATH Open document ID: 1231.91369
author: Marta Biancardi
author: Giovanni Villani
published in: Computational Economics
publication date: 2010-06-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
zbMATH DE Number: 5721670
zbMATH Keywords: IEA
zbMATH Keywords: coalition stability
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: monetary transfers
describes a project that uses: Maple
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10614-010-9197-z
OpenAlex ID: W1988198121
cites work: Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
cites work: COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
cites work: On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
cites work: Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
DOI: 10.1007/S10614-010-9197-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5721670