Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
zbMATH Open document ID: 1230.91096
author: Florian Englmaier
author: Achim Wambach
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2010-07-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-127126
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 5732006
zbMATH Keywords: contract theory
zbMATH Keywords: linear contracts
zbMATH Keywords: incentives
zbMATH Keywords: sufficient statistics result
zbMATH Keywords: inequity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3121411784
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.007
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5732006