Leadership games with convex strategy sets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Leadership games with convex strategy sets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1230.91022
author: Bernhard von Stengel
author: Shmuel Zamir
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2010-07-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27653/
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 5732014
zbMATH Keywords: commitment
zbMATH Keywords: correlated equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: first-mover advantage
zbMATH Keywords: follower
zbMATH Keywords: leader
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2166294754
Wikidata QID: Q57935139
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.11.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5732014