A theory of hung juries and informative voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A theory of hung juries and informative voting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1230.91034
author: Fuhito Kojima
author: Yuki Takagi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2010-07-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5732018
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2009.12.003
OpenAlex ID: W2121621444
cites work: A Bayesian model of voting in juries
cites work: Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
cites work: Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.003
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5732018