Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society
zbMATH Open document ID: 1193.91051
author: Yasuhito Tanaka
published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation
publication date: 2010-09-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5776997
zbMATH Keywords: type two computability
zbMATH Keywords: social choice function
zbMATH Keywords: the gibbard-satterthwaite theorem
zbMATH Keywords: infinite society
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: dictator
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.amc.2007.02.130
OpenAlex ID: W2049346398
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DOI: 10.1016/J.AMC.2007.02.130
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5776997