Efficient and strategy-proof voting over connected coalitions: a possibility result
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient and strategy-proof voting over connected coalitions: a possibility result
zbMATH Open document ID: 1232.91169
author: Veronica Block
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2010-09-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5780010
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: generalized single-peakedness
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: connected coalitions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2010.03.009
OpenAlex ID: W2075299163
cites work: Voting by Committees
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
cites work: The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.03.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5780010