Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1195.91061
author: Daniel Quint
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-09-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5781222
zbMATH Keywords: first price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: common values
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous information
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-009-0491-8
OpenAlex ID: W2142656498
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cites work: Information Acquisition in Auctions
cites work: Mid-auction information acquisition
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-009-0491-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5781222