Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1201.91160
author: Matthew O. Jackson
author: Alison Watts
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2010-09-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/95031/
review text: The authors provide a general framework and methodology for analyzing how matching and the play of games interact. They focus on favouring small populations in equilibrium play, and show how repetition can change behaviour.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 5788967
zbMATH Keywords: social games
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: games
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiation
reviewed by: George Stoica
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3121670828
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.02.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5788967